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THE PLACE OF "VARIABLE ANNUITIES"
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
John H. Dorsey*
The Supreme Court has decided, by the narrowest possible margin, that
"variable annuities" are "securities," not "insurance."' This is a simple state-
ment of a conclusion of law. But its import rests on a complex of facts, federal
statutes, economics and states' rights which gave rise to the issue.
Resolution of the legal issue was dependent upon the proper interpreta-
tion of three important federal statutes designed to protect the public, the
investor and the public interest' as applied to a type of contract which came
into being in 1952 - after all of them were on the books - and was labelled
with the coined name "variable annuity," one without legal ancestry.
Perhaps no new financial vehicle since the birth of corporations has
generated more legal controversy than the "variable annuity." Members of
the securities business were insistent that the contract was a "security" within
the meaning of that term as defined in the Securities Act.
3 The insurance in-
* Mr. Dorsey was counsel for the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., in the
litigation that recently culminated in a Supreme Court decision upholding the view of "variable
annuities" advanced by him. Although Mr. Dorsey has tried to be objective in preparing this
article, he suggests that readers should be aware of his advocacy of the opinions contained herein.
1 In the consolidated cases of SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., and National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. Same, 359 U.S. 65, decided March 23, 1959. The named respondent
will here be referred to as VALIC; the other respondent, The Equity Annuity Life Insurance Co.,
as EALIC; the SEC and National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., jointly as SEC/NASD.
2 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952); Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80a-52 (1952); and McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1952).
3 Section 2(1) provides: "When used in this title, unless the contekt otherwise requires - The
term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate. certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing."
(489)
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dustry was split as to whether it was "insurance" and hence a proper product
to be sold by insurance companies.
4
Insurance Commissioners for the District of Columbia (1956), West
Virginia (1956), Kentucky (1957) and Arkansas (1957) authorized the
sale of "variable annuities" as insurance. In West Virginia, notwithstanding
the authorization of the Insurance Commissioner, the State's Security Com-
missioner initiated an action to enjoin the sale unless the sellers complied
with the State's Securities Law.5 The Supreme Court of Errors of the State of
Connecticut held that "variable annuities" do not qualify as insurance in that
State.6 Persistent efforts to have state laws amended so that "variable an-
nuities" can qualify as insurance have met with no success.Y
4 The presidents of the country's two largest insurance companies, The Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company and the Prudential Life Insurance Company, were, for example, on opposite
sides of the fence. See Ecker, The Case Against Variable Annuities, Dun's Review and Modem
Industry (Oct. 1956); and Shanks, Do Variable Annuities Meet the Need? Dun's Review and
Modem Industry (Sept. 1956). Insurance technicians, likewise, were of differing opinions. See, for
example, I PROCEEDInGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 162-65
(1956).
5 State v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., Circuit Court of Kanawha County, W. Va., Docket
No. 24,449. This case was tried July 21-22, 1958. As of the date of this writing the court still has
the case under advisement.
6 Spellacy v. American Life Ins. Ass'n, 144 Conn. 346, 132 A.2d 834 (1957).
7 Legislation Which Would Have Authorized Sales of Variable Annuities to Public:
State Year Bill Disposition
Connecticut 1957 House 1427-to incorporate Joint Hearing March 21, 1957.
the Equity Life Insurance Referred by House Joint Resolution
Company. 170 to Legislative Council for study.
Maryland 1955 House 597-to incorporate the No action.
Variable Life Income Cor-
poration of Maryland.
House 730-to provide for Passed House.
the establishment and opera- Died in Senate Committee.
tion by Life Insurance Cor-
porations of a variable con-
tract account, etc.
Massachusetts 1956 House 1560-to authorize life Joint Hearing February 6, 1956. No
insurance companies to estab- transcript was made. Referred to
lish variable contract accounts, Special Commission for study by
etc. House 2716.
Special Commission held public hear-
ings on April 30 and May 1, 1957 to
consider House 1560. No transcript
of these hearings was made but the
Special Commission issued its report
covering these hearings on December
2, 1957 as Massachusetts Senate
Document 556 of 1958. In this re-
port the Commission recommended
further study, looking toward atFrm-
ative legislation authorizing the is-
suance of annuities based upon some
portion of equity investment.
The Special Commission held an-
other public hearing on May 28,
1958 to discuss, among other things,
variable annuities. Speakers were re-
It is the purpose of this article to take the reader behind the scenes of
the Supreme Court opinion to give some insight into the history of the
"variable annuity" and the gestation of the test case.
State Year Bill
1958 Senate 815 App. B-to au-
thorize life insurance com-





1955 Senate 69-to authorize life
insurance companies to es-
tablish variable contract ac-
counts.
1955 Assembly 305, 306, 307.
1956 Assembly 450, 451, 452.
1957 Assembly 11, 12, 13.
1958 Assembly 330, 331, 332.
1954 Assembly 1323 (Senate 2681)
-to incorporate Variable An-
nuity Corporation of Amer-
ica.
1955 Senate 1352 (Assembly 1657)
-to incorporate Variable
Life Income Corporation of
America.
1957 Assembly 4044-to incorpo-
rate Variable Life Income
Corporation of America.
1955 Senate 332 (House 737)-
providing for the formation
of corporations for the pur-
pose of issuing variable an-
nuity contracts.
Disposition
quested to confine their remarks to
developments on the subject since
the hearing approximately one year
before. No transcript was made. The
Special Commission isued its report
dated July, 1958 as Senate Docu-
ment 815. The Special Commission
reported, without recommendation, a
variable annuity bill as Appendix B
to its report (S. 815).
Referred to Special Commission for
study by Senate 842.
This bill was the subject of a public
hearing by the Massachusetts Joint
Insurance Committee on September
29, 1958. No transcript of this hear-
ing is available.
Killed in Senate on March 24, 1955
after hearing before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banks and Insurance.
Public hearing before the Assembly
Committee on Business Affairs May
13, 1955. Transcript available. Died
in Assembly Committee.
Public hearing before the Senate
Committee on Business Affairs June
22, 1956. Transcript available. Passed
Assembly; died in Senate Committee.
Passed Assembly; died in Senate
Committee.
Public hearing on May 2, 1958 be-
fore the Assembly Committee on
Business Affairs. Transcript available.
Passed Assembly; in Senate Com-
mittee.
Passed both houses. Vetoed by Gover-
nor Dewey.
Passed in Assembly. Bill died in
Senate Committee.
Died in Assembly Committee.
Died in Committee.Texas
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I. THE GENESIS OF THE "VARIABLE ANNUITY"
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA), a
legal reserve life insurance company selling only to college staff members,
made exhaustive economic, actuarial and legal studies of the retirement
problem of its annuitants.' It came to the conclusion, which cannot be the
subject of dispute, that fixed dollar annuities purchased twenty to thirty years
in the past had failed, because of inflation, to provide the contract-holders
with the financial protection after maturity date which had been anticipated.
As a result it decided to supplement the legal reserve life insurance annuity
by offering to college staff members "A new method of providing retirement
income through periodic investments in common stocks and the payment of
a variable, or unit, annuity in combination with a traditional fixed dollar
annuity."9 In effectuating its decision, TIAA, in apparent recognition that
the scheme was not insurance, set up an independent entity called College
Retirement Equity Fund (CREF), to administer the common stock invest-
ment fund. Under the plan a participant was and is required to have a mini-
mum 50% of the payments credited to his account made applicable to the
purchase of a fixed dollar anuity in TIAA. Any other portion of the payments
to his account up to 50% he can elect to have invested for him in CREF, in
which each payment will purchase for him pro rata shares in CREF's invest-
ment portfolio at current value. CREF deducts all expenses from the fund.
Although the participant is credited with shares in the fund ("units"), these
shares have no cash or loan value. Should the participant survive after a
retirement date specified in the contract he receives a monthly pension pay-
ment until death which is computed on the basis of the month to month in-
vestment experience (realized and unrealized gains and losses plus income) of
the fund. Thus the participants are saddled with the risk of the fund's invest-
ment experience. To the end of 1956 CREF had issued contracts to more
The table appearing above summarizes only those bills which would have
authorized life insurance companies, or new companies known as life
insurance companies, to sell "variable annuities" to the public. It does
not include pension plans, which are not insurance, and do not and
could not qualify under general insurance laws, such as:
1. The College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), sold only to college
professors. By Special legislation CREF was authorized to do business
by the State of New York subject to regulation and control of its
Insurance Commissioner under four provisions of the State's general
insurance laws (An Act to Incorporate College Retirement Equities
Fund for the benefit of the teaching profession, N. Y. Laws 1952,
C. 124); or
2. Three bills passed by the Wisconsin Legislature in 1957 which in-
corporated the "variable annuity" principle into the retirement systems
for state employees, state teachers and the teachers of Milwaukee on
much the same basis as CREF, Wisconsin Laws 1957, Chs. 322, 381,
423; or
3. Two bills introduced in the Massachusetts legislature (S. 341 and
S. 815) (both of 1958) which are essentially "variable annuity" bills
but limited to group business.
8 APPROACH TO RETIREMENT INCOME, published by TIAA in 1955, which is described on the
fly leaf as:
"An economic Report prepared by William C. Greenough, Ph. D., vice president
of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America, as background for
its proposed COLLEGE RETIREMENT EQUITIES FUND."
9 Id.
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than 31,000 college staff members and the value of its shares has increased
from $10 to $18.51. It is a matter of general knowledge that this period has
been one of inflation and prosperity and that common stock averages have
sky-rocketed. But the spread from $10 to $18 cannot be considered a profit
per share for all participants. One purchasing a share in 1956 was required to
pay $18 for the same share which sold in 1952 for $10; and those who
purchased in between paid the then current value of a share. Should the
inflationary trend continue the participant can hope that his pension will
exceed what he would receive under a fixed dollar annuity and to some extent
ease the financial pains of inflation. On the other hand, because he is required
to have also a fixed dollar annuity, he will not be destitute in a period of
deflation. 10
CREF did not qualify under the general insurance laws of any state. It
was incorporated by special legislation in the State of New York, which made
it subject to the supervision of that State's Insurance Commissioner under only
four provisions of the voluminous general insurance laws of that State."
10 See an Address to the Church Pension Conference, Dec. 4, 1958, on Variable Annuities, by
Wilmer A. Jenkins, Executive Vice President, TIAA and CREF, in which he details the pros and
cons of CREF. Cf. the following, excerpted from a proposal of Robert Slater, Vice President, John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., which is included in the 2 PROCEEDINos OF THE NATIONAL AssociATIoN
OF IN sRANcE CoMMissloaNRs 413 (1957):
The variable annuity contract as such departs from the traditional life in-
surance principle of guaranteed or fixed benefits. It does, however, represent a
solution to more of the problems affecting the group annuity business than any
other plan devised to date. The variable contract does have some disadvantages
although they may not disqualify such a contract in its entirety by any means.
For example:
(a) The variable contract assumes that over the long-term period the rise in the
value of stock market prices should equal or exceed the increase in the cost-
of-living. This point is not in dispute historically, but as fluctuations in the
stock market are not directly proportionate to trends in the cost-of-living,
the past may not be a portrayal of the future;
(b) while over long periods of time reasoning from the relationship of stock prices
and the cost-of-living may be sound, it is not sound over short periods of time
- the period of time, from month to month, with which retired people are most
concerned. People must live from month to month on their pension checks
and sharp temporary fluctuations in the market can affect their ability to meet
living expenses. Recently several sharp breaks in the market value of common
stock have coincided with such events as the -
1. heart attack of President Eisenhower;
2. Middle East crisis;
3. change in interest rates;
while at the same time the cost-of-living index has been rising. Consequently,
an annuity geared too closely to stock prices can operate over relatively short
periods of time differently than for the long-term trend;
(c) if employers wish to finance more of their pension costs through the medium
of equity investments, they should be permitted to do so. If, however, it
turns out that this was not the best way to do so, it hardly seems fair or
equitable to have the retired employee pay the price for this error in judgment.
Employers as corporations are a continuing entity and may be in a better
position to absorb the costs of fluctuations in the stock market than are the
retired employees;
(d) it will be very difficult to explain to individuals why an annuity supposedly
geared to provide for an increase in cost-of-living is on some occasions de-
creasing in amount when the cost-of-living is actually increasing. This will be
true regardless of whether the annuity arises from an individual or a group
annuity.
11 See "An Act to incorporate College Retirement Equities Fund for the benefit of the teaching
profession," N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, ch. 124.
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That this was special legislation in a true sense and that the product sold was
fraught with potential abuses which could be inimical to the purchaser and
the public interest is suggested by the fact that the New York Legislature has
since the advent of CREF refused on three occasions to authorize the in-
corporation of companies to sell "variable annuities" to the public.' 2
II. THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC ATTRACTIONS OF THE "VARIABLE
ANNUITY"
In the 1930's and early 1940's most new pension programs were financed
through group annuities (fixed guaranteed dollars) written by life insurance
companies. Few were placed with trust companies or self-insured by the
employer. Today the vast majority of new pension plans are either self-insured
by the employer or placed with trust companies under a trust agreement.
Life insurance companies are finding it necessary to spend considerable time
and money merely to conserve business in force.13
In past decades pension plans, in the main, were the sole responsibility
of management. Today this is no longer the case. Labor, under collective
bargaining agreements, either has or is seeking an equal voice in the admin-
istration of pension plans. Provisions of these programs are subject to change
from bargaining session to bargaining session. Consequently, contracts similar
to those issued by life insurance companies, i.e., heavily weighted with
specific guarantees to the employee, do not have the flexibility required in
making changes in pension plans from time to time. In fact, the only guarantee
desired in many of the current pension programs is the guarantee given by
the employer. If commitments provided are inflexible, they tend to make
pension programs sources of future collective bargaining difficulties. Assets
of insurance companies cannot in any way be segregated for group annuities
and, as a result, in some instances an employer depositing or withdrawing
funds at a time advantageous to him can do so to the disadvantage of the
large body of individual insurance policy owners.
Funds presently placed with life insurance companies, regardless of the
purpose for which they are deposited, must be invested in those securities
designated by law. Investment and other regulations made many years ago
for individual insurance were also made applicable to group insurance when
it came into existence. Life insurance companies must conform to the re-
strictions placed upon them by the State in which they are domiciled and also
to those in force in States where they do business. New York, for example,
seriously limits the extent to which a domiciled company may invest in com-
mon stock. "Foreign" companies operating in New York must conform sub-
stantially to the New York requirements. There can be no special funding,
i.e., a given investment must be held for all insurance obligations regardless
of whether the obligations differ in nature. A company, for example, could
not make an arrangement with an employer to place more of his pension
12 See footnote 7, supra.
13 Cf. a proposal by Robert Slater, Vice President, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Company, for the issuance of group annuities with a special funding provision, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANcE COMMISSIONERS 410-17 (1957).
VARIABLE ANNUITIES
funds in common stocks than is held for the general insurance obligations of
the company. In most states the percentage of assets permitted in equity in-
vestments is very low. Consequently, the resulting inflexibility of investment
policy imposed by state law is not conducive to encouraging employers to
finance their pension plans through life insurance companies. As a matter of
fact, the use of equities in conservative long-term investment programs is not
a new or untried practice.
Attempts have been made to overcome these problems within the scope
of present state regulatory laws, as previously mentioned, by introducing
contracts having names such as Deposit Administration or Pension Admin-
istration. Because of the rigidity of state regulation, which prevents flexibility
of investment policy, the net result has been that although these contracts
have solved some of the problems, they have not reduced the major dis-
advantages under which life insurance companies presently operate in the
pension field. New business has not increased but actually has decreased in
spite of the great growth in pension programs.
In the life insurance industry, which does not lack leaders of great
business acumen, there are some who visualize a commercial adaptation of
the CREF plan ("variable annuity") which would restore the industry to a
favorable competitive position in attracting pension fund business with little
risk of financial loss. Since the risks of investment experience would be borne
by the pensioners, the only risks which the companies would take is that
their self-determined loading charges would not cover expenses or un-
favorable mortality experience. Since the annuity mortality table is unilaterally
selected by the company and can be a "conservative" one, the latter risk can
be minimized.
"1H. A COMMERCIAL VERSION OF A "VARIABLE ANNUITY"
The term "variable annuity" has no precise meaning that can be reduced
to a lexicographer's definition. Instead it refers to a scheme capable of in-
numerable ramifications. To avoid the pitfalls of generalization by definition
we substitute a description of the terms of VALIC's "Deferred Variable An-
nuity Policy," which was received in evidence in the test case and considered
by the courts as a specimen of the contracts that employ such investment
practice.
A. Provisions of the "Variable Annuity" Contract
The purchaser of a "Deferred Variable Annuity Contract," whom we
shall refer to as "the investor" (referred to in the contract as "the annuitant"),
agrees to make specified periodic payments to VALIC during a stipulated
period from ages 0 to 70 years. After deducting "loading charges" that are
retained by VALIC for expenses and profits,' 4 the net remaining from each
payment is invested by VALIC in a fund for the account of the investor. This
fund is exclusively managed, controlled and operated by VALIC. The con-.
14 The "loading charge" for the first year exceeds 50% of the payment available for purchase
of "accumulation units." See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, 359 U.S. at 82.
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tract contains no specification of the manner in which VALIC is to invest
the capital thus made available to it nor the precise manner in which invest-
ment increments, if any, are to be distributed to investors.
At the time of each payment the investor purchases and is credited with
a number of shares in the fund (referred to in the contract as "accumulation
units"), determined by dividing the current value of a share at the time of
payment into the net payment. The value of the shares fluctuates with
VALIC's investment experience. The contract provides that at least once each
year VALIC shall notify each investor of the total number of shares ("ac-
cumulation units") credited to his account and the dollar value of each share
as of the date of notification.
Throughout the period during which the investor makes periodic pay-
ments (referred to herein as the "accumulation period") he may at any time
cash in his shares at current value (this the contract calls "cash value") as a
result of which he may realize a profit or loss. During this same period the
investor may cash in a portion of his shares at current value (this the contract
calls a "policy loan"). If he reinvests (repays) what the contract terms a
"policy loan" he is not necessarily credited with the same number of shares
he cashed in. Instead, his "repayment" purchases shares at their current value
as of the date of "repayment." Thus the investor may on "repayment" acquire
a greater number of shares than he would have had if he had not entered
into the "loan" transaction, or a lesser number. This is in contrast to true
insurance policies or annuity contracts which set forth and guarantee fixed
"cash values" and "loan values."
During this period the investor may also speculate by taking advantage
of the so-called "Grace Period" and by making payments "on or before" the
due date provisions of the contract. VALIC establishes the dollar value of a
share ("accumulation unit") as of the last day of each month. If the investor
is of the opinion that the dollar value of a share will decrease by the end of
a given month he can withhold his payment until the next month. If he guesses
right he will receive more shares for the same payment. If he thinks the dollar
value of a share will increase in the future he can make advance payments
and purchase shares at current value.
Throughout the period during which the investor is making payments
to VALIC there is no life or other insurable contingency involved. The in-
vestors provide the capital, share in the earnings and profits, and bear the
risk of loss resulting from investment of their funds by VALIC.
By contrast, investment and mortality prognostications are used by an
insurer to fix its selling price. The risk that premium rates plus future realized
investment income may prove to be inadequate is borne by the insurer; and,
should that result come about, it does not affect the contractual obligation
of the insurer to the insured upon the occurrence of the insurable contingency.
The "variable annuity" contract does not obligate the investor to partici-
pate in the investment fund to any further extent than that set forth above. It
does give the investor an election to take cash or to purchase a so-called
"variable annuity" between the ages of 50 and 70 years. If he elects the
"variable annuity," he makes a "capital payment" to VALIC computed by
VARIABLE ANNUITIES
multiplying the number of shares ("accumulation units") credited to his
account times the current value of a share. For each $1000 of this payment
VALIC pays him a first monthly payment of less than $10 per thousand,
computed on the basis of the Progressive Annuity Mortality Table at 3 %
interest. 15 In a true annuity contract computed on the same basis the same
monthly amount, guaranteed at the inception of the contract, would be paid
to the annuitant for the entire term.
After the first monthly payment the investor is assured no specific, or
even any, subsequent monthly payments during the term of the contract. In-
stead, he is credited with a number of shares (called "annuity units") in the
investment fund.16 The future value of these shares ("annuity units") is
speculative in that all monthly payments, if any, subsequent to the first, are
computed by the formula number of shares times the current monthly value
of a share resulting from VALIC's operation, management and control of the
investment fund. Before the investor's interest can be known, VALIC deducts,
as a prior charge, a management fee (1.8% per annum), and investment
taxes (undescribed in the contract and of uncertain amount). The investor is
paid each month for life, or other optional term, the uncertain future current
monthly value, if any, of a share ("annuity unit") times the number of shares
credited to his account. VALIC is legally indifferent what the value of a
share, each month, may prove to be. The contract does not assure the investor
that he will have a fixed dependable income, or any income, for the remainder
of his life. Instead, he has only the hope of gain and bears the risks of loss.
B. Insurance Benefits, If Included in the "Variable Annuity" Contract, Are
De Minimis, Separate and Severable
VALIC requires that the purchaser of a deferred "variable annuity"
contract, if insurable and within certain age limits, purchase a contract for
5-year decreasing term life insurance. Its "General Information and Rates"
book states:
All individual deferred annuity policies will be issued with a minimum
amount of life insurance on the annual decreasing term plan unless the
applicant fails to meet the Company's insurability requirements. In the
case of annual premium policies, the initial amount of insurance in the
first policy year will be equal to five times the annual basic annuity
15 From the inception of the contract to the date of election the investor cannot know what
capital he will have acquired, for he cannot forsee how many shares ("accumulation units") he
1will have purchased or their value as of the date of election. Since, as admitted by VALIC's actuary
and a member of its Board of Directors, VALIC does "not guarantee the investment experience" it
stands legally indifferent whether the value of the shares held by the investor at the date of election is
more or less than the total amount invested. The investor has only the hope that VALIC's manage-
ment, operation and control of the investment fund in which he has an aliquot share will result in a
profit and not a loss.
16 The number of "annuity units" credited to the purchaser's account is determined by dividing
the first month's guaranteed payment by the current value of such unit. The number of units
remains constant for the balance of the term of the contract. One who elects to purchase a
"variable annuity" contract when the value of an "annuity unit" is low will have more such units
credited to his account than another making the the same capital investment under the same contract
when the value of the unit is high. The former, owning more shares, will receive larger payments
than the latter in the same month (since each unit has the same value) although each has invested
an identical amount of dollars.
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premium. In the case of single premium policies the amount of life
insurance in the first policy year will be equal to one-half of the single
premium. In both the annual and single premium cases, the amount of
insurance will decrease one fifth each year until at the end of the fifth
year it will be zero.
... Individual policies without life insurance will be issued to:
(1) applicants from age 61 to 70, inclusive; and (2) from age 0 to 60
on uninsurable applicants.
An investor may also elect to have included in his contract as a rider "A total
and permanent disability premium waiver benefit."
It was conceded at the trial that the 5-year decreasing term life insurance
and the total and permanent disability premium waiver benefit are true
insurance. But VALIC sells the bare "variable annuity" without such insur-
ance.
In those cases where the investor satisfies medical requirements and
purchases one or both of the aforementioned types of insurance, the premium
for the coverage is deducted from the amount he would otherwise have avail-
able for purchases of shares ("accumulation units") after VALIC has de-
ducted its loading charges. Compared to the total payments made by the
investor this amount is de minimis. In the case of the specimen contract,
which provides for the investor's payment of $1000 per year to VALIC, the
cost of the 5-year decreasing term life insurance over the 5-year period would
be $100.85, equal to a little over 2% of the total payment of $5000; and if
the contract remained in force for 30 years of payments by the investor, out
of total payments amounting to $30,000 only $100.85 or 3/10 of 1% would
be applied to life insurance premiums. The disability premium is $39.60 per
annum.
VALIC's book "General Information and Rates" indicates that it offers
at the option of the purchaser of a "variable annuity," additional term in-
surance. There was no evidence that VALIC has ever sold such insurance.
The District Court, in its findings of fact, found that "The distinguish-
ing and predominant nature of a variable annuity is found in its provision
for sharing profits and losses in a common fund to be invested mainly in
common stocks." The Court of Appeals found that the life insurance contracts
sold by VALIC "are a small part of its total business" and are "irrelevant to
the question of the nature of the predominant annuity feature of the policy.'
7
C. The Format of and Terms Used in VALIC's "Variable Annuity" Con-
tract
VALIC's "variable annuity" contracts are printed in a format usually
associated with insurance contracts. Found in them are insurance terms such
as "cash value" and "loan value," but by definition therein they differ from
and are at variance with the usual insurance meaning of the terms. Also
found in the contracts are insurance terms such as "The Death Benefit," "The
Beneficiary," "Grace Period," "Protection from Creditors," "Incontestability,"
17 257 F.2d 201, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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"Suicide." Most of these can apply pnly to the 5-year decreasing term life
insurance (if included in the contract) and are not relevant to the "variable
annuity" provisions of the contracts.
The terms in the contract which are the vitals of its so-called "variable
annuity" are "gross investment rate," "net investment rate," "net investment
factor," "accumulation unit," "value of an accumulation unit," "annuity
unit," and "annuity unit value." These terms are not found in insurance
nomenclature.
IV. SALES LITERATURE AND TECHNIQUES
Second only to the "variable annuity" contract itself in probative value
as to its legal and economic character are sales literature and techniques used
in promoting sale of the product. Such are persuasive evidence as to whether
the sales appeal emphasizes the hope or expectation that a profit will accrue
to the purchaser as a result of the seller's management of a securities port-
folio.
The sales literature of both respondents in the test case, it would appear,
was designed to imply that their "variable annuity" contracts were insurance
against the economic ills of inflation. For example, brochures captioned:
"Retirement with Protected Purchasing Power" - "Inflation-Proof An-
nuities," - contained statements that this was to be accomplished by in-
vesting the purchaser's money in a portfolio of common stocks which "will
provide an income which will tend to keep pace with the cost of living." The
purchaser would have a "proportionate ownership" in the fund reflected by
shares which he purchased at current values, the shares being called "units."
EALIC, which stipulated that its "variable annuity" contracts were in all
material respects the same as VALIC's, in a brochure, "Equity Annuity - a
new road to Security," described the scheme:
Our variable annuity program is designed to minimize the speculative
features of common stock investments. You avoid the gamble of
buying a single stock... [T]he company "spreads the risk" by buying
stocks in many of the nation's leading corporations... You avoid the
risk of buying stocks on a "hot tip". Instead you benefit from the counsel
of expert financial advisers.., in short you get the benefit of expert
diversification.
Let us look at an example of VALIC's sales techniques. Using two stock
price indices entirely unrelated to VALIC activity ("Standard and Poor's
Weekly Composite Index of 480 stocks for price and Standard and Poor's
Daily Composite Index of 90 stocks for yield"), VALIC presumed to show
a prospective purchaser how he would have benefited had he invested in a
"variable annuity" instead of a conventional annuity during the period 1940-
1955. The tables and graph set forth in the exhibit are based, not upon the
experience of VALIC, but upon stock market averages of securities which
differed substantially from VALIC's portfolio. VALIC obviously used this
technique to imply future results.
A comparison of the sales literature's statements and implications as to
what the "variable annuity" contract provides and the actual provisions of
the contract revealed that the contract does not insure "Retirement with Pro-
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tected Purchasing Power," or against losses resulting from inflation or in-
crease in costs of living, or "an annuity income that cannot be outlived." It
does not even mention these objectives.18 The only guarantee in the contract
is a first monthly payment of less than $10 for each $1000 of capital payment
(the amount of which is unforeseeable until the month of election). Every
provision for subsequent monthly payments by VALIC is conditioned on its
investment experience.
The contract does state that "The company guarantees that the dollar
amount of such installments after the first (monthly payment) shall not be
affected by variations in the actual mortality experience of payees from the
mortality experience assumptions of the Progressive Annuity Mortality
Table." This is meaningless. The contract itself explicitly obligates VALIC
to pay an amount equal to the product of the current value of each "annuity
unit" times the number of such shares credited to his account. It follows that
the quoted reference to mortality is a mere redundancy because experienced
departures from the expected mortality, whether in the direction of longer or
shorter life, could have no effect on the operation of the basic formula which
describes VALIC's obligation to pay under its contract. 19
V. THE ISSUEs IN THE TEST CASE
Being of the opinion that the "variable annuity" is a "security" within
the meaning of that term as defined in Sec. 2(1) of the Securities Act20 and
that each of its issuers was an "investment company" within the meaning of
that term as defined in Sec. 3 (a) of the Investment Company Act,2 the SEC
initiated an action to enjoin VALIC from violating the registration provisions
of the Securities Act 2 and the Investment Company Act. 3
On their own motions NASD 24 and EALIC intervened on the sides of
the plaintiff and defendant, respectively.
In their answer VALIC and EALIC admitted that they sold and were
selling and offering for sale "variable annuity" contracts through the mails
and means of instrumentalities of interstate commerce and that they had not
complied with the Federal securities laws. They denied that the "variable
18 While "inflation," with its attendant increase in the cost of living and depreciation in the
value of the dollar, may be an insurable contingency, the "variable annuity" contract does not
indemnify or guarantee against loss therefrom.
19 The Court, in SEC v. VALIC, described VALIC's assumption of the mortality risk as ...
apparent, not real; superficial, not substantial." 359 U.S. at 71.
20 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77b(1) (1952). The definition is set forth in footnote 3, supra.
21 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(a) (1952):
Sec. 3. (a) when used in this title, "investment company" means any issuer which-
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has
any such certificate outstanding; or
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire invest-
ment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's
total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an uncon-
solidated basis.
22 48 Stat. 74 (1933) §§ 5(a)(1) and 5(c); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)(1) and 77e(c) (1952).
23 54 Stat. 789 1940) § 7; 15 U.S.C. § S0a-7 (1952(.
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annuity" is a security and that they are investment companies. Affirmatively
they pleaded that: (1) the "variable annuity" contract is "insurance" and
an "annuity contract" exempt from registration by § 3 (a) (8) of the Securities
Act; 25 (2) each is an "insurance company" exempt from registration by §
3(c) (3) of the Investment Company Act;26 and (3) the offering for sale and
the selling of such contracts is "the business of insurance" exempt from
Federal jurisdiction by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Thus the pivotal issue
framed by the pleadings was whether the "variable annuity" contract was
"insurance" within the meaning of that term as used undefined in the
Securities Act, the Investment Company Act, and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
The respondents contended that: (1) the contract was "insurance"
because they were chartered as insurance companies and the contracts had
been approved by insurance commissioners in the states in which they were
authorized to do business; (2) they were subject to regulation by these com-missioners; (3) this regulation was sufficient to protect the public interest;
(4) the contracts included all the provisions prescribed by the insurance laws
for the District of Columbia; (5) their investments were regulated by such
laws (in the District of Columbia the insurance laws do not limit the amount
that an insurance company may invest in common stocks); and (6) they
used a mortality table and were committed to make "variable annuity" pay-
ments over the uncertain life span of the contract holder.
The SEC/NASD countered: (1) the term "insurance" is used in the
Federal statutes in its commonly accepted sense; (2) risk-shifting is essential
to an insurance contract;28 (3) the "variable annuity" is not "insurance" be-
cause it lacks the legally indispensable element of risk-shifting; (4) the print-
ing of a contract in a form that looks like an insurance policy and the use of
insurance terms therein do not make a contract "insurance";29 (5) mortality
24 NASD is a duly organized national securities assocation registered with the SEC (5 S.E.C.
627 (1939)) exercising Congressionally delegated powers in the over-the-counter securities market
conferred by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 48 Stat 881 (1934) § 15 A, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3
(1952).
25 Sec. 3. (a) Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this title shall not apply
to any of the following classes of securities:
Sec. 3"(a) 8) Any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract or optional annuity
contract, issued by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner, bank
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like functions, of any State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia;
26 Sec. 3. (c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), none of the following persons is an
investment company within the meaning of this title:
(3) Any bank or insurance company ....
This must be read in conjuction with the section defining "Insurance Company":
Sec. 2. (a)(17) 'Insurance Company' means a company which is organized as an insurance
company, whose primary and predominant business activity is the writing of insurance or the
reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies, and which is subject to supervision by
the insurance commissioner or a similar official or agency of a State; or any receiver or similar
official or any liquidating agent for such a company, in his capacity as such.
27 VALIC and EALIC were chartered as stock life insurance companies in the District of
Columbia in 1955 and 1956, respectively. There was no dispute that their primary and predominant
business was the sale of "variable annuities."
28 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941); Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d
239, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Commonwealth v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149 (1870).
29 Helvering v. Le Gierse, supra note 28 at 541.
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tables are used by an insurer in conjunction with future estimated income as
a kind of a cost accounting device to fix its selling price, are not part of an
insurance contract and do not affect the legal obligation of an insurer to pay
the insured upon the occurrence of the contingency insured against; (6) there
is nothing in the Federal securities laws or the McCarran-Ferguson Act which
suggests that the Congress gave State insurance commissioners the power to
determine that a given contract is one of "insurance" and thereby to exempt
it or its issuer from compliance with such laws; (6) Congress had prescribed
how securities were to be regulated foreclosing the argument as to whether
regulation by insurance commissioners would adequately protect the investor,
the public and the public interest; and (7) the McCarran-Ferguson Act
exempts only "the business of insurance" from federal regulation and not
necessarily the business of companies that happen to have been chartered as
insurance companies.S°
VI. THE "VARIABLE ANNUITY" CONTRACT IS NOT INSURANCE BECAUSE
IT LACKS THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF RISK-SHIFTING
A. The Risk Shifted by Insurance or an Annuity
Insurers, in connection with life insurance and annuity contracts, insure
against the hazards attendant on the uncertainties of the life span. The two
types of contracts are equated in the insurance concept because of the elements
of certainty and mortality that inhere in both.
An insurer that sells both life insurance and annuities is selling certainty
to its policy holders, despite that fact that each individual has a life of un-
certain duration; certainty that the dependents of the insured will have a
definite amount of money if he dies; and certainty that the annuitant will have
a fixed dependable income after a certain age for the continuing years of
his life. 31 From the viewpoint of the insured, life insurance is assurance
against loss from early death; annuity, loss from longevity."
Unless the risk of loss attendant on death or longevity is contractually
shifted to and asumed by an insurer, the contract, nothwithstanding its label
or the corporate charter of the issuer or any other criterion, is not insurance.
From what source or through what economic methods the insurer acquires
the money to meet its contractual obligations is no part of an "insurance"
contract. The contract fixes only the insurer's obligation to pay.
30 To hold that simply because an entity is chartered as an insurance company it can avoid
federal regulation of any activity that it can persuade a state insurance commissioner to approve is
incompatible with the language and purpose of the federal laws. It would make any one insurance
commissioner the arbiter of federal jurisdiction insofar as insurance companies are concerned.
31 Accord, HuEBNsE, Ln's INsuRANca 130-32 (4th ed. 1950).
32 HusBNsa, op. cit. supra note 31, at 3, 91, defines "life insurance" and "annuities" thus:
From the standpoint of the individual, however, life insurance may be defined as
consisting of a contract, whereby a stipulated compensation, called the premium,
one party (the insurer) agrees to pay the other (the insured) or his beneficiary, a
fixed sum upon the happening of death or some other specified event.
An annuity therefore represents the purchase of a fixed income (monthly, quarterly,
semi-annually, or annually) and the general purpose of the contract is seen to be
the reverse of that accomplished under life insurance.
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B. The "Variable Annuity" Does Not Shift the Risk of Loss Attendant on
the Contingency of Longevity.
In the accumulation period, during which the purchaser of a "variable
annuity" contract is making payments to the issuer, there can be no question
that the issuer's operations are those of an investment company.33 The con-
tract purchaser is then an investor in every sense of the word. The purchaser
supplies the capital, purchases shares in an investment fund which he may
cash in at any time at current value, and is dependent upon VALIC's exclusive
management, operation and control of the fund. The value of his shares
fluctuates with the fund's investment experience. It is a purely speculative
venture in which the purchaser has only the hope of gain and bears the risk
of loss. Does this investment venture become "insurance" because the partici-
pant elects at a future time to become a party to the "variable annuity" period
of the contract? It does not; for if he so elects he agrees to purchase shares
("annuity units") in the same investment fund, at current value, and for the
term of the contract (from date of election to date of death of the participant,
or other optional term) and the issuer agrees to make him an uncertain pay-
ment, the amount of which is dependent upon its future, month to month,
investment experience resulting from its exclusive management, operation
and control of the investment fund. 34
During this "variable annuity" period, the issuer does not guarantee that
any payments will be made to the shareholders or that capital which they have
supplied will not be dissipated by investment losses.
Reference in a "variable annuity" contract to an annuity table and a
provision that payments to shareholders will not be decreased because mor-
tality of shareholders may be less than indicated by the table are meaningless
when analyzed. The Progressive Annuity Table at 3 %, referred to in the
specimen contract, is used for one purpose only; to determine the first
monthly payment to be made to the contract holder, which in all contracts is
less than $10 per $1000 of capital investment.35 The total first monthly pay-
ment thus determined is then divided by the current value of an "annuity
33 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, 359 U.S. at 85.
84 Compare the classic description of the rights of an insurance policy-holder appearing as
follows in People v. Security Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 78 N.Y. 114, 123 (1879):
The fund produced by the payment of all the premiums does not in any sense belong
to the policy-holders but belongs exclusively to the company; and the policy-holders
are interested in it in the same way only that the creditors of any other corporation
are interested in its fund.
with the following from District Court's opinion, 155 F. Supp. at 524:
.Where as the money paid for conventional insurance becomes the absolute property
of the insurance company, the money paid for a variable annuity goes into an
investment fund which becomes, by operation of law if not by express terms of
the contract, a trust fund for the equitable interests of the contract holders.
See also 8 CoucH, CYCLOPEDI OF INsURANcE LAW, §§ 2043-2045.
35 This could hardly be held to be a substantial risk assumed by the issuer. Cf. Keller v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 312 U.S. 543 (1941).
36 Reference to a mortality table is not necessary to effectuate the "variable annuity" scheme.
Promoters could establish any arbitrary table of first monthly payments, at any specified age, per
$1000 invested and employ VALIC's formula of dividing the total first monthly payment by current
value of an "annuity unit" and thus determine the number of "units" (shares) purchased. Whether
the VALIC formula (which employs a mortality table) or an arbitrary table is employed does not
affect the principle of the transaction.
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unit" share and the resulting number of shares is purchased by the investor
and credited to his account. Ownership of these shares, with their uncertain
future monthly value, is all that the purchaser receives for his capital pay-
ment.3" Subsequently, payments for the term of the contract, if any, depend
upon the issuer's investment experience. 37
A statement in the contract that the issuer guarantees that the dollar
value of "annuity unit" shares will not be affected by "variations in mortality
experience" is redundant.38 By specific provision in the contract, the issuer
takes the calculated risk that the number of outstanding shares may require it
to dip into its surplus, if any, or the capital contributions of its shareholders.
This is a risk taken by an entrepreneur; it is not an "insurance" risk in the
sense explained in Helvering v. LeGierse:
Historically and commonly insurance involves risk-shifting and risk-
distributing... That these elements of risk-shifting and risk-distributing
are essential to a life insurance contract is agreed by courts and com-
mentators.3 9
That risk-distributing, even coupled with a life contingency, does not
make a contract insurance may be demonstrated by an illustration: A person
who buys a pari-mutuel ticket at a race track participates in a scheme for
risk-distribution. If the track should require, as a condition of collecting
(should he prove lucky enough to have his horse win), that he be alive and
personally present the ticket at the pay-off window, he would also participate
in a scheme involving a life contingency. But it would not be insurance.
VALIC's "variable annuity" contract differs in detail but not in substance
from the illustration. Both entail speculation - in the pari-mutuel on a horse
winning a race, in the "variable annuity" on VALIC's good luck or skill with
its investments. In both, the availability of a sum to collect is contingent not
on survival alone but on a speculative chance as well. In both, the amount
collected, if any, is not related to or indemnification for any loss occasioned
by the insurable contingency of continuing life beyond a specified age.
37 In the specimen contract if VALIC begins with a fund which, with a 3MA% "net investment
rate," is sufficient to maintain level payments to a group of individuals, then if the net investment
return is actually zero instead of 31M%, no investment return will in fact be distributed and the
successive payments will become smaller and smaller. Since there is no investment income to be
distributed, only the original fund will be distributed; and the original fund will be lessened by
VALIC's management fee of 1.8% per annum and such amounts as it may be required to pay for
investment taxes. If there is actual capital loss on investments, in excess of income, then it is
obvious that not all of the original fund will in fact be distributed to the contract holders, since part
of it will never be available for distribution, having been lost through investment misfortune.
Under the usual form of life annuity contract, so long as the insurer is solvent, the con-
tract holder gets the same payment, no matter what may happen to the insurer's investments. The
insurer may become insolvent by reason of adverse investment experience alone, but VALIC can
never become insolvent by reason of adverse investment experience alone. It is the contract holders
who will bear the investment losses; and if these are large enough, the individual's losses contingent
upon survival to respective payment dates will not be indemnified as guaranteed in an annuity contract.
38 Such a statement cannot be found in a true annuity or life insurance contract since the risk
of adverse mortality experience is a calculated one taken by an insurer. An insurer's obligation to
the insured is contractually fixed upon the happening of the insurable contingency.
39 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1940). "It is not enough to show that the insurance company assumed
'some' risk. A bank assumes a risk when it accepts a depositor's funds and invests them. The in-
vestment may prove to be an unsafe one, or the bank may have agreed to pay the depositor a higher
rate of interest than it can profitably earn on the funds it invests. Indisputably this is a risk. But it
is not an insurance risk in the sense explained in the Le Gierse case." Keller v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 312 U.S. 543, 544 (1941).
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"Risk-shifting" is legally indispensable to insurance. The potential loss
which a conventional annuity shifts to an insurer is not shifted to or assumed
by the issuer of a "variable annuity" contract. The purchaser remains saddled
with the risks of longevity and risks of equity ownership.
VII. OPINIONS OF THE LOWER COURTS
A. The District Court
The District Court found that:
A VALIC and an EALIC contract holder invests money with the
respective defendants with the hope or expectation that a profit will
accrue to him as a result of the management of the portfolio of securities
purchased by VALIC and EALIC with the money invested by the con-
tract holder, and his expectation of profit based upon the efforts of
others applies to both the 'accumulation period' and to the repayment
or variable annuity period.
The risk of profit or loss on investment is borne by the contract
holders.
The distinguishing and predominant nature of a variable annuity
is found in its provision for sharing profits and losses in a common
fund to be invested mainly in common stocks.
The insurance features of such contracts do not alter the invest-
ment characteristics.
In its opinion40 the District Court stated that "[t]he logic of the law applied
to the established facts seems to bring the variable annuity contract within the
purpose and intendment of the Securities Act, and the defendants within the
terms and plans of the Investment Company Act." It so found as a conclusion
of law. Without making a finding that the "variable annuity" contract is
"insurance' and its sale "the business of insurance," the District Court denied
the injunction because: (1) VALIC was chartered as an insurance company;
and (2) its "variable annuity" contracts had been approved by the Insurance
Superintendent of the District of Columbia and by the insurance departments
of three states (West Virginia, Kentucky and Arkansas). From this premise
the court reasoned that the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act ex-
empted the contract and its sale from compliance with the Federal securities
laws.
B. The Court of Appeals
On appeal none of the parties excepted to the trial court's Findings of
Fact.
The Court of Appeals said that:
... the most important risk that the purchaser desires to shift when he
buys an annuity is the risk that he will live longer than his funds will last.
It then went on to show that the risk is not shifted by the "variable annuity"
contract by saying:
The appellants urge that VALIC policy holders, like investors in in-
vestment companies, may lose their savings and ultimately fail to receive
the protection which they hope to buy when they paid their premiums.
40 155 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C. 1957).
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That fact seems to us to be inherent in the nature of this experiment in
annuity contracts.
In affirming the District Court, in an opinion4' unsupported by reference to
case law or other authorities, the Court of Appeals failed to find or hold that
the "variable annuity" contract is "insurance" or an "annuity." It found that
the sale of "variable annuity" contracts is a "novel" arrangement, a "new
business" which "resembles insurance." Paying no heed to the substance of
the contracts, the court attached controlling weight to approval of the con-
tracts by the Superintendent of Insurance for the District of Columbia and the
insurance commissioners of three states. It did not indicate that it had given
consideration to the expert opinion of the SEC that the contracts are securities.
Instead of adjudicating the legal issue presented as to whether the contracts
are in substance a "security" or "insurance" the court supported its conclusion
on its assertion that there is an economic need for such contracts, and that
"The definitions in the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act
indicate that if the insurance commissioner of a state subjects the business to
his supervision, it is the business of insurance."
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The foregoing sections of this article by no means state all the law or
exhaust all the arguments on the issues which were presented during the course
of the litigation. For example, the philosophy, legislative history and reported
key cases of the federal securities laws, much of which appears in the Supreme
Court's opinions, has been omitted. As stated before, this article attempts
to picture by the use of a broad brush the economic development of the
"variable annuity," what it is and the legal atmosphere which led to the
ultimate determination that its legal character is that of a "security." The
"variable annuity" is not all "security;" it is shaded by "insurance." But the
trappings of insurance did not blind the Court to its substance as an invest-
ment contract and registerable security.
The Court's logic in reaching the conclusion that the "variable annuity"
is a "security" can be succinctly summarized:
1. The term "insurance" when used in a Federal statute is a "federal
term"42 and must be interpreted "as it has commonly been conceived
of in popular understanding and usage."
43
2. The "variable annuity" is not insurance because the risk of loss con-
tingent on longevity is not shifted to the issuer.44
3. The "variable annuity" is a "security" because it "places all the in-
vestment risks on the annuitant, none on the company."45
The opinion also dispels a common misinterpretation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act; namely, that insurance companies are exempted from federal
jurisdiction. That Act exempts only "the business of insurance," which all
lexicographers agree is the business of making insurance contracts. The
Court held that, "[t]he question common to the exemption provisions of the
41 257 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
42 359 U.S. at 69.
43 Id. at 73.
44 Id. at 71.
45 Ibid.
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Securities Act and the Investment Company Act and to § 2(b) of the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act is whether respondents are issuing contracts of in-
surance."
46
The concurring opinion 47 sets forth in more detail the legislative history
of the federal securities law and the jurisdiction of the states in the insurance
field, and analyzes the provisions of the specimen "variable annuity" con-
tract.4 It should be carefully read by those interested in the theory of statutory
construction as well as those interested in the subject of "variable annuities."
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan49 would leave "regulation
of the business of insurance exclusively to the States." 50 Yet it does not define
what it means by "insurance."' The reader is left with the impression that
the dissenters are of the opinion that any contract labelled "insurance,"
regardless of its substance, is exempted from Federal jurisdiction by reason
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
IV. FUTURE PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION
The Supreme Court's opinion is not a panacea for the legal problems
attendant on the "variable annuity." It is only a catalyst.
Let us look at some of the problems that flow from the finding that the
"variable annuity" is a "security":
1. In the pay-in period it appears beyond dispute that the activities of
the issuer bring it within the definition, in the Investment Company Act, of
an "open-end" investment company52 since the issuer stands obligated to
redeem "units" held by a purchaser. There is no such repurchase obligation
in the pay-out period.
... [T]he investor, during the pay-out period, is in almost every way as
much a participant in something equivalent to an investment trust as in
[the pay-in period] ... [T]he individual payment is still a payment
measured basically in the same way as one's interest in an investment
trust is measured. And in a very real sense the investor is more vitally
interested in the investment experience of the company at this period
than he ever was in the pay-in period, and in a way more vitally than
any holder of an open-end investment company certificate, or share in
a publicly traded closed-end company ever is: he has become completely
'locked in.' He obviously cannot draw down the present value of his
'units' once the option to receive annuity payments has been exercised;
he cannot 'cash in his chips' that he bought in the faith of the manage-
ment of the fund; his rights are technically assignable, but practically
unmarketable since they depend on his individual life span. The com-
pany can radically change investment policies, change advisers, do what
ever it pleases . . . and there is nothing the contract holder can do
about it.53
46 Id. at 68.
47 By Mr. Justice Brennan, joined in by Mr. Justice Stewart.
48 Id. at 73-93.
49 Concurred in by Justices Frankfurter, Clark and Whittaker.
GO 359 U.S. at 100.
51 Throughout the opinion the phrase "the business of insurance" is repeated time and time
again without any attempt to resolve the pivotal issue in the case - what is the meaning of the
term "insurance" when used undefined in a Federal statute?
52 54 Stat. 789 (1940); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-5(a) (1952).
53 Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, 359 U.S. at 88-89.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
The question raised is whether the SEC has the power to use its broad
dispensing powers 54 to deny the contract holder, during the pay-out period,
the protections of the Investment Company Act which the Congress prescribed
for the protection of the investor, the public and in the public interest.
2. Exempted from the Investment Company Act are insurance com-
panies whose "primary and predominant business activity is the writing of
insurance."5 5 In the test case the respondents' primary and predominant
business was admittedly the sale of "variable annuities." Consequently, even
though they were chartered as insurance companies they were held to be non-
exempt. But, consider the situation where a large insurance company such as
the Prudential, whose primary and predominant business is the writing of
insurance, might issue "variable annuities." It seems clear that the Prudential
would be required to comply with the Securities Act. Would it, however, be
exempt from complying with the Investment Company Act, thus denying to
investors the protections of the Act?
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires over-the-counter
brokers and dealers in securities to register with the SEC. They must maintain
appropriate records and file statements of financial condition and be subject
to inspection at any time by the SEC and to denial or revocation of registration
in certain contingencies. There are general provisions outlawing fraud. The
SEC has a considerable amount of rule-making authority. Will the issuers
and sellers of "variable annuities" be required to comply with the provisions
of this act? Does the SEC have authority to promulgate rules peculiar to the
"variable annuity?"
4. In a state in which the "variable annuity" comes within the statutory
definition of an "annuity" and is subject to the general insurance laws, with
which it cannot comply because of statutory restrictions on investments in
equities, will the state permit "variable annuities" to be sold to its citizens as
securities?
5. In a state in which the "variable annuity" is subject to and complies
with the general insurance laws, will its sale be taxed as insurance by the state
and as a security transaction by the federal government?
6. Will the capital gains and other income of the "variable annuity"
investment fund be subject to the federal taxes applicable to investment funds?
7. Where the "variable annuity" scheme is employed for a group pension
plan, will it qualify for the favorable Federal tax rate applicable to such
plans? If so, will individual "variable annuities" be treated differently, tax-
wise, than such group plans?
8. In their briefs and arguments before the Supreme Court in the test
case, the respondents advanced the academic suggestion that the "variable
54 The SEC's dispensing authority in regard to the Investment Company Act is found in § 6(c),
which provides: "The commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by order upon
application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any
class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title
or of any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes
fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this title."
55 54 Stat. 789 (1940) § 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c) (1952); and 54 Stat. 789 (1940) § 2(a)(17),
15 U.S.C. 80(a)-2(a)(17) (1952).
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annuity" scheme could be brought within the insurance concept by guarantee-
ing an insignificant fixed amount to the purchaser upon the occurrence of the
insurable contingency of longevity plus an uncertain additional amount to be
determined by the issuer's month to month investment experience. This they
attempted to equate to participating insurance. In vacuo the guaranteed fixed
payment upon the occurrence of the contingency would appear to be in-
surance. But, to add to this hope of gain from the issuer's investment ex-
perience may well change the legal character of such a contract. In the first
place "dividends"56 paid to holders of participating insurance policies are
wholly within the discretion of the insurer's board of directors. 57 Secondly,
state insurance laws require that if a "dividend" is declared it must be equitably
distributed among the insured in like status. Economically, the premium cost
of such a contract as compared to its fixed return might well make it unsalable
to the public.5" Legally, if the issuer promotes such a contract holding out the
hope of gain to be realized with relation to a participation in the issuer's
investment experience, will he thus bring the contract within the Securities
Act definition of a "security"? 59
Conclusion
It may be conceded freely that the "variable annuity" contract may be one
of great potential benefit to the public. If one ignores the fallibility of man-
agement, it is possible that those who have a pro rata interest in a "variable
annuity" fund might realize an increase in the value of their interest which
might alleviate some of the financial liabilities of inflation. Attainment of the
objective, however, is speculative inasmuch as the "variable annuity" scheme,
admittedly, does not assure such a result. Man has not yet created an economic
plan that will insure against the vagaries of inflation; it seems unlikely that h6
ever will.
Newton's Laws of Motion tell us that for every action there must be an
equal and opposite reaction. Magnetic forces are aligned positive and nega-
tive. Interpolating these physical principles in empirical economics, the hope
of gain is always accompanied by the risk of loss. So it is in the "variable
annuity."
No honestly conceived and intelligently worked out offering of "variable
annuities" will be injured by the revelation of the whole truth required by the
federal securities laws.
56 In the insurance business the word "dividend" is to some extent a misnomer, the "dividend"
on a participating policy being partly in the nature of a refund and not altogether a return on in-
vestments as the term is generally used in commercial transactions. See HuEBNER, op. cit. supra note
31, at 300; MAcLEAN, Ln'E INs RANCE 148, n.1 (8th ed. 1957).
57 "Dividends" on participating policies are not necessarily attributable to the insurer's invest-
ment experience. They are paid out of surplus funds which, inter alia, may result from loadings in
the premium rate pricing proving to be more than sufficient to provide for expenses and contingencies.
HuEsmR, op. cit. supra note 31, at Ch. XXIX.
58 See 359 U.S. at 90 (concurring opinion).
59 See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); and SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the Court held that it is the substance, not form, of the contract
that is determinative of its legal character.
